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Enforcing federal law seems simple enough. Federal agencies,
which exist for exactly this purpose, enforce by identifying violations of
a particular federal statutory scheme and accompanying regulations.
But complications quickly arise. How should agencies enforce—by
initiating judicial proceedings, by enacting rules or guidance to better
define statutory proscriptions, by adjudicating matters within agencies,
or by combining some or all of these powers? What role, if any, should
federal courts have in adjudicating enforcement disputes or reviewing
agency enforcement? Should only federal agencies be able to enforce
federal law, or should state agencies or private parties also do so? And
under what conditions?
In Private Enforcement in Administrative Courts, Professor
Michael Sant’Ambrogio meticulously catalogues various dynamic
considerations for enforcement design—such as competition among
political values, the effects of political and political-economic conditions,
and constraints on financial and investigatory resources—to begin
answering these questions. 1 Of the many insights in his article, perhaps
his most significant contribution is demonstrating that the very basic
categories of how scholars typically envision enforcement schemes are
incomplete. Courts, scholars, or both have discussed public and private
enforcement in judicial proceedings and public enforcement. 2 Yet with
empirical data in hand, Sant’Ambrogio demonstrates that private
*
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1.
See Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Private Enforcement in Administrative Courts, 72 VAND. L.
REV. 425 (2019).
2.
See id. at 7–27.
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enforcement in administrative proceedings is a robust form of
enforcement that, despite or because of its undertheorized state, comes
in numerous varieties. 3
Sant’Ambrogio argues that a hybrid private/public enforcement
model in agency proceedings may provide the best hope of striking the
proper balance among various values, considerations, and constraints
to achieve optimal enforcement. 4 In other words, a blunderbuss
approach of choosing public enforcement or private enforcement
(whether in judicial or agency proceedings) is unlikely to prove ideal.
Nuance is necessary. He identifies various tools—such as agencies’ role
in the review or initiation of proceedings, 5 or the use of class-wide
proceedings 6—that Congress or agencies can use to calibrate agency
enforcement to its optimal design.
In a similar vein, my purpose is to consider three additional tools
that may optimize enforcement goals with hybrid public and private
enforcement, whether inside or outside of administrative proceedings.
Those tools are:
(1) statutorily-mandated primary jurisdiction,
(2) enforcement in either judicial or agency proceedings by state
authorities, and
(3) limits on federal preemption of concurrent state-law private
causes of action.
The first tool helps Congress balance the roles of agencies and
courts. The latter two divide power between competing sovereigns in
public and private enforcement. All three help provide Congress a more
sophisticated toolbox when attempting to achieve optimal enforcement
over a statutory scheme’s lifetime. Importantly, during that lifetime,
the weight of competing values may shift based on politics, economic
realities, or changing cultural mores, and these tools allow some
dynamism in the enforcement design.
Of course, numerous other tools deserve consideration. Yet, due
to space constraints, I shall consider three that may be overlooked
because, as with primary jurisdiction, they have fallen out of use 7 or
because, as with the latter two tools, they concern federalism, an oftenoverlooked doctrine in discussions of federal administrative law. 8
3.
See id. at 23–27.
4.
See id. at 5.
5.
See id. at 23–27.
6.
See id. at 56.
7.
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Primary Jurisdiction: Another Victim of Reality, 69 ADMIN. L. REV.
431, 437 (2017) (noting that “[j]udicial invocations of primary jurisdiction have become rare”).
8.
See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023,
2026 (2008) (noting that “[f]ederalism and federal administrative law are an unfamiliar couple,
particularly in Supreme Court precedent,” and arguing for courts to use administrative law to
further federalism values).
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I. DIFFICULTIES OF DESIGNING ENFORCEMENT
As Sant’Ambrogio discusses in detail, designing enforcement
regimes requires accounting for numerous competing considerations.
Both public and private enforcement alone are often inadequate. Public
enforcement alone is often insufficient because of limited agency
resources to investigate and litigate all matters. 9 Private enforcement
alone can interfere with agencies’ ability to create a uniform, coherent
approach to enforcement. 10Likewise, judicial and administrative
adjudication alone can prove unsatisfactory. Regardless of whether an
enforcement regime relies on agencies or private parties, adjudication
in judicial proceedings may inspire more confidence than in
administrative proceedings because of judges’ perceived impartiality
and judicial proceedings’ perceived fairness. 11 That confidence,
however, may come at the cost of an agency’s adjudicatory subjectmatter expertise. 12 A marriage of private and public enforcement inside
and outside of agencies can, if properly balanced, have the benefit of
mitigating an agency’s lack of resources, provide additional information
to the agency, and buttress the legitimacy of the enforcement regime. 13
Nonetheless, value balancing can prove especially difficult
because of empirical questions over a particular value’s significance.
For instance, as Sant’Ambrogio recognizes, little empirical evidence
supports the intuition that expertise promotes efficiency and better
decisionmaking. 14 If anything, the limited empirical evidence cuts
against the intuition. 15 And, of course, politicians or administrators
may simply prefer one value—such as efficiency or adjudicatory
9.
See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 1, at 2, 5, 9–10.
10. See id. at 14–15.
11. See id. at 32–33. As I have discussed elsewhere, many administrative adjudicators have
fewer protections from agency influence than judges or federal administrative law judges (“ALJs”).
Depending on the particular group of non-ALJ adjudicators, an agency may allow ex parte
contacts, performance reviews and performance bonuses, and combined functions within the
agency. See generally Kent Barnett & Russell Wheeler Non-ALJ Adjudicators in Federal Agencies:
Status, Selection, Oversight, and Removal, 53 GA. L. REV. 1 (2019) (providing survey data on the
hiring and oversight of non-ALJs); Kent Barnett Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1643 (2016) (arguing that ALJs, based on their indicia of impartiality as compared to nonALJs, are preferable). Indeed, the characteristics that influence a non-ALJ adjudicator’s actual or
perceived impartiality are often difficult to ascertain. See generally Kent Barnett Some Kind of
Hearing Officer, 94 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (proposing that agencies provide and post a
one-page disclosure concerning the characteristics that concern their various adjudicators’
impartiality).
12. See id. at 34–37.
13. See id. at 9–10.
14. See id. at 35.
15. See Joshua D. Wright & Angela M. Diveley, Do Expert Agencies Outperform Generalist
Judges? Some Preliminary Evidence from the Federal Trade Commission, 1 J. ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT 82 (2013) (finding that the decisions of generalist federal trial judges fare better
than those of FTC administrative law judges on appeal).
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independence—over another and thus have different conceptions of
optimal enforcement.
Relatedly, it is often difficult to know how administrative tools
can foster or hinder a particular value over time. Consider the goal of
permitting accountable agencies to create coherent enforcement
policies. Agencies lose some control if courts, as opposed to agencies,
entertain and decide enforcement actions. But agencies still have other
ways of coordinating enforcement strategy. For example, they can
promulgate policy statements to guide agency-enforcement discretion, 16
substantive regulations to specify the underlying statute’s
requirements that have the force of law, 17 and interpretive or noticeand-comment rules to clarify ambiguous statutory provisions (which
may be entitled to Chevron deference even after a court has interpreted
that provision differently 18). 19 Nevertheless, the quantum of control
that these tools provide is neither susceptible to mathematical
exactness nor fixed in intensity over the course of a statutory scheme.
In short, Congress must necessarily weigh various considerations
without perfect information and within a dynamic ecosystem of
administrative options.
Even when Congress appropriately weighs these values and
understands the effect of administrative tools, statutory schemes are
not self-enforcing. The efficacy of enforcement depends on everchanging factors. If regulated industry has “captured” the enforcing
agency, the enforcing agency is less likely to initiate investigations or
adjudications, or to seek meaningful remedies for violations. 20 Agency
political appointees may also have different value judgments than the
enacting Congress, leading to over- or under-enforcement, as compared
to the enacting legislature’s intent. 21 Finally, aside from political
appointees’ policy views, the agency bureaucracy may simply prove
ossified and unable to respond nimbly to new practices that cause
harms that the statutory scheme seeks to avoid. 22
II. TOOLS FOR OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT
Sant’Ambrogio moves the discussion over how to achieve optimal
enforcement forward by conceptualizing enforcement models in four key
ways: public enforcement in either judicial or administrative
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 1987).
See Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 79–81 (1st Cir. 1998).
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand-X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
See id.
See, e.g., Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 1, at 11, 39–40.
See id. at 11.
See id.
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proceedings, and private enforcement in either judicial or
administrative proceedings. His significant contribution is considering
how enforcement in agency proceedings is often hybrid in nature—
permitting or requiring both public and private participation. Coming
in different varieties, hybrid enforcement may have the most promise
in creating optimal enforcement regimes. He also notes how different
forms of hybrid enforcement can affect underlying values. For instance,
permitting private parties to file complaints only with the agency’s
blessing can permit an agency to prevent enforcement yet provide the
agency more control. 23
My purpose here is to consider how additional tools—some that
directly relate to hybrid enforcement in administrative proceedings and
some that do not—may prove useful in achieving optimal enforcement.
A. Primary Jurisdiction
The first tool is statutorily mandated primary jurisdiction.
Primary jurisdiction, in its most usual form, is a discretionary doctrine
similar to abstention, where courts can stay litigation to permit an
agency to choose to decide an issue first. 24 Although the Supreme Court
has stated that “[n]o fixed formula exists for applying [primary
jurisdiction],” 25 courts typically consider the relevance of agency
expertise 26 and the need for uniformity. 27 Despite primary jurisdiction’s
prominence as a judicially crafted doctrine, statutes can mandate its
use by requiring private parties to present an enforcement action to the
relevant agency before proceeding in court. One flavor of statutory
primary jurisdiction already governs Title VII claims. Private parties
must first present their claims to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”). They can file a civil action in court only if the
EEOC does not act within 180 days, declines to file its own civil action,
or fails to reach a settlement agreement with the implicated parties. 28

23. See id. at 23–25, 53.
24. 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.1, 1161–62 (5th ed. 2010).
25. United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
26. See id.
27. Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574–75 (1952) (quoted in Nader v.
Allegheny Airlines Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 304–05 (1976)).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2018) (“If a charge filed with the [Equal Employment
Opportunity] Commission . . . is dismissed by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty
days from the filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c)
or (d), whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section . . . or the
Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party,
the Commission . . . shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of
such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the
person claiming to be aggrieved . . . .”); see also PIERCE, supra note 24, § 14.1, at 1166 (discussing

132

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:127

Much like administrative adjudication, primary jurisdiction can
come in numerous varieties. It may, as with Title VII, give agencies the
chance to assert their own judicial action or attempt to settle the matter
voluntarily with the parties. 29 But it could, as is common, permit
agencies to decide matters in administrative adjudication. 30 The ability
to hear matters in administrative adjudication permits agencies to
decide to what degree they would like to provide, or scale back,
adjudicatory resources or procedures for in-house determination based
on the agency’s priorities, enforcement strategy, or caseload volatility.
Primary jurisdiction is an extremely promising tool for
recognizing the benefits of both public and private enforcement. Its
raison d’être is to recognize the importance of agency expertise,
uniformity, and coherent regulatory policy. 31 Because primary
jurisdiction does not ordinarily require the agency to litigate the
matter, 32 it also recognizes limitations on agencies’ resources or
preferences for particular enforcement vehicles. Even if agencies
decline to decide the matter, they are still able to obtain information
from private parties that agencies may not otherwise have learned.
Agencies can also decide whether to expend some of their litigation
resources in participating in some manner in judicial proceedings.
Private parties can obtain a forum regardless of agencies’ decisions, and
private parties and their lawyers can provide additional, private
resources to aid public enforcement. These private-party actions can
also curb the effects of regulatory capture by providing additional
enforcing parties and judicial oversight. At the same time, by giving the
agency the ability to decide the matter or encourage settlement outside
of court, primary jurisdiction and other similar pre-suit requirements
promote judicial efficiency and provide a mechanism for limiting the
number of private suits. 33
Title VII’s provisions as a rare statutory mandate for congressional requirement for primary
jurisdiction).
29. Even if finding reasonable cause to support a discrimination claim, the EEOC is not
required to file a civil claim. See Brandon Wheeler, Note, Amending Title VII to Safeguard the
Viability of Retaliation Claims, 98 MINN. L. REV. 775, 780 n.39 (2013) (citing Civil Action By the
Commission, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.27 (2018)).
30. See, e.g., S. Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local 627, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 425 U.S. 800,
806 (1976) (per curiam) (referring question of representational status for collective bargaining to
the National Labor Relations Board); Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe v. Wicker, 39 F.3d 51 (2d Cir.
1994) (referring question of group’s status as a tribe to the Bureau of Indian Affairs).
31. See Pierce, supra note 7, at 436; see also Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 1, at 42–47 (describing
value of having agency implement coherent enforcement policy).
32. See Owner-Operator Ind. Drivers Ass’n v. New Prime, 192 F.3d 778, 785–86 (8th Cir.
1999).
33. Cf. Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (“[T]he legislative history indicates
an intent [with 60-day pre-suit notice obligations under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976] to strike a balance between encouraging citizen enforcement of environmental
regulations and avoiding burdening the federal courts with excessive numbers of citizen suits.”).
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Despite its promise, primary jurisdiction does have some
potential drawbacks. First, it slows down private enforcement by
requiring time for agency consideration. 34 Prominent scholar Richard
Pierce attributes concern over litigatory lethargy as the reason for
courts’ increasing reluctance to use the doctrine. 35 Second, privateparty enforcement can hamper agencies’ enforcement strategies by
permitting actions to proceed that agencies have determined may
create unhelpful law or cause over-enforcement as to relatively minor
matters. 36 Yet, good statutory design can mitigate, even if not fully cure,
these concerns. Time limitations, as with Title VII claims, on agency
review, for example, can help keep litigation moving. 37 To combat
disruption to agencies’ regulatory agendas, agencies can intervene in
judicial proceedings to ensure that courts are aware of their views,
especially their disfavor of particular cases or novel legal
interpretations. 38 Indeed, agencies can also turn to notice-and-comment
regulations that have the force of law and can even overcome certain
judicial legal interpretations. 39
B. State and Federal Enforcement
Aside from using primary jurisdiction to allocate responsibility
horizontally between federal courts and agencies, Congress can also
allocate authority vertically among sovereigns. By permitting state-led
public enforcement in either state agency or judicial proceedings
(concurrent with federal public enforcement), Congress can mitigate
two concerns over federal agency enforcement. First, the presence of
other actors to enforce federal statutory schemes reduces the risks or

Similar pre-suit notice requirements are fairly common in federal litigation. See, e.g., Toxic
Substances Claims Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2018); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2018); Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (2018); False Claims Act,
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2018); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2018).
34. See Pierce, supra note 7, at 436 (“Invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine has one
major disadvantage: it has the potential to delay resolution of the dispute before the court.”).
35. See id. at 436–37.
36. See, e.g., Diana R. H. Winters, Restoring the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine, 78 OHIO ST.
L.J. 541, 594–95 (2017) (concluding that discretionary “referrals” to the agency under the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction potentially infringe on agencies’ domain of determining their own
procedures).
37. Although mandated primary jurisdiction that requires agency review before judicial
consideration does delay a party’s access to court, it does so in a way that does not clog judicial
dockets because the agency proceedings must conclude before a party can file a judicial action.
38. Indeed, Pierce notes that “[c]ourts routinely ask agencies to submit amicus briefs in which
the agencies apprise courts of their interpretations of agency-administered statutes, rules, and
tariffs.” See Pierce, supra note 8, at 437.
39. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
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reality of regulatory capture. 40 Even if regulated entities have created
incentives for federal regulatory actors to eschew enforcement actions,
state actors are able to fill the void. Second, state enforcement
supplements resource-challenged federal agencies.
As Sant’Ambrogio discusses, the use of private enforcement can
present its own problems. Private enforcement can undermine an
agency’s uniform policy and lead to over-enforcement. Private parties
may have very different incentives than regulators. They may have
stronger pecuniary interests in litigating or have an oversized sense of
the importance of the regulated entity’s alleged transgression than
agencies that see numerous cases. 41
Other public actors, however, may provide a better antidote to
concerns over regulatory capture and limited resources than private
parties. State regulators, like their federal counterparts, are politically
accountable and thus provide some necessary democratic legitimacy in
defining how to go about protecting the “public interest.” 42 Indeed,
depending on the state, those state regulators may have even more
political accountability than federal regulators if the head of the
enforcing agency is elected. 43 State enforcers, also like their federal
counterparts, have the opportunity to learn of numerous alleged
violations in their jurisdictions and prioritize their efforts accordingly.
To be sure, state regulators, like federal regulators, may also be subject
to regulatory capture, especially given state agencies’ comparative lack
of media and other civic oversight. 44 But a regulated industry’s ability
to capture fifty state agencies is a more complicated enterprise,
requiring significant coordination and resources, than capturing one
federal agency or key federal legislators, such as congressional
committee chairs.

40. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 56–58 (2010).
41. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 1, at 13–14.
42. Cf. id. at 13 (noting that private enforcement lacks political accountability that is focused
on the “public interest”).
43. See Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
1385, 1399–1401 (2008) (comparing the nature of “unbundled executives”—through state-wide or
local elections—in the states). Berry and Gersen challenge the perceived wisdom that plural
executives are less politically accountable than a unitary executive. They argue that political
accountability suffers with plural executives whose duties overlap because the electorate may be
confused as to which executive was responsible for a particular policy. But when the plural
executives have clear, separate authority, the electorate is better able to hold that official
accountable for his or her actions. Indeed, voting for a unitary executive is a much cruder affair in
which the electorate has to weigh its satisfaction with numerous, unrelated policies. Id. at 1403–
05.
44. See Miriam Seifter, Further From the People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 93
N.Y.U. L. REV. 107, 148 (2018).
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The states’ role need not interfere with the federal agencies’
regulatory priorities to a significant degree. Take state enforcement of
federal financial law under Title 12 of the U.S. Code as a comprehensive
example. Except in emergencies, state officials must notify relevant
federal regulators of their intent to file a civil action or administrative
proceeding and provide them with the to-be-filed complaint. 45 The
notice must specifically include “whether there may be a need to
coordinate the prosecution of the proceeding so as not to interfere with
any action, including any rulemaking, undertaken by [federal
regulators].” 46 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)
can elect to intervene, meaning that it may be “heard on all matters
arising in the action,” remove the matter to federal court, and appeal
any order or judgment as any other party might. 47 Finally, the CFPB
has specific rulemaking authority over state-and-federal coordination. 48
In addition, Congress limited the kinds of permissible state
enforcement under Title 12 to account for federal policymaking. First,
it limited the regulated entities subject to state-enforcement
authorities: in short, state attorneys general alone can assert claims
against national banking entities, while state regulators (along with
state attorneys general) can do so only against state entities. 49 Second,
Congress distinguished the kinds of claims that the state authorities
can bring. In short, state authorities can assert claims under Title 12
and CFPB regulations promulgated under it against state entities, 50
but state attorneys general can assert claims against national entities
for only violations of CFPB regulations, not standalone statutory
violations. 51 These distinctions give states less enforcement authority
over national entities—those in which the federal agencies have the
most interest—in two ways. It requires higher profile state actors (state
attorneys general, as compared to other state regulators) to sue. By
having attorneys general enforce, Congress has chosen other salient
political actors who are less likely to suffer from the tunnel vision that
can lead to agency over-enforcement and that may undermine federal
priorities. 52 Congress, perhaps more importantly, has limited the
attorneys general from pushing novel legal interpretations by
prohibiting them from suing national banks directly under the statute.
Instead, the attorneys general may only enforce certain federal
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

12 U.S.C. § 5552(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2018).
See id. § 5552(b)(1)(C)(iii).
Id. § 5552(b)(2).
See id. § 5552(c).
See id. § 5552(a)(1).
See id.
See id.; id. § 5552(a)(2).
See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 1, at 49.
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regulations under the statute, thereby cabining the litigation discretion
and rendering it more likely that state enforcement will not undermine
federal objectives. 53
C. State-Law Causes of Action
As part of allocation authority among sovereigns, Congress can
create a framework for encouraging state experimentation for private
enforcement. To be sure, Congress can include private rights of
enforcement directly in the federal statutory schemes that it creates.
Federal private causes of action can allay the risk of agency capture and
supplement federal litigation resources. 54 But recall that private
enforcement may lead to over-enforcement or disruption to a reticulated
regulatory agenda. 55 A middle ground exists between an all-or-nothing
approach that either creates or prohibits a federal cause of action.
Congress can give states and agencies space to fashion bespoke statelaw causes of action that further federal objectives.
A prime example arises in the consumer-protection context. The
Federal Trade Commission Act allows the Federal Trade Commission
to enforce the act’s prohibition on unfair and deceptive trade practices. 56
It does not create a private right of action for consumers harmed by
deceptive or unfair trade practices. 57 But every state provides
consumers private rights of action, although the predicates for the
actions and the associated remedies vary widely among the
jurisdictions. 58 Many of these statutes instruct courts to interpret the
statute consistently with the Federal Trade Commission Act, creating
more regulatory cohesion between federal and state law. 59 Without
providing a federal cause of action, Congress has taken some pressure
off federal dockets and allowed states to have a more significant role in
enforcing consumer protections.
When Congress fears that regulatory interests have captured a
federal agency, simply leaving state causes of action as an option may
prove insufficient. A captured federal agency could seek to limit
53. See id. at 13 (noting that private parties may assert novel legal interpretations that are
contrary to an agency’s interpretations or agenda).
54. See id. at 9–11.
55. See id. at 14, 63.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2018) (“[U]nfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce[] are hereby declared unlawful.”).
57. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
58. See, e.g., DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW
§§ 6:2, 6:10 (2018 ed. 2018).
59. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 10-1-391(b) (West 2010) (“It is the intent of the General Assembly
that this part be interpreted and construed consistently with interpretations given by the Federal
Trade Commission in the federal courts . . . .”); accord TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.46(c)(1).

2019]

TOWARDS OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT

137

concurrent state action by preempting state laws by broadly
determining that state law is inconsistent or otherwise an obstacle to
federal law. Indeed, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(“OCC”) did just that in response to potent consumer-finance state laws
in the early 2000s. 60 In the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Congress limited the OCC’s ability to
preempt certain laws. 61 Congress permitted the OCC to preempt certain
consumer-finance state laws on a case-by-case basis only after
satisfying numerous detailed statutory requirements and lessdeferential-than-usual judicial review. 62 It even required the OCC to
review its preemption decisions every five years and to notify relevant
congressional committees of its review. 63 In a similar context with the
CFPB, Congress has gone so far as to permit federal preemption based
on the inconsistency of state and federal law while clarifying that
inconsistency does not arise merely because state laws provide greater
consumer protections than federal law. 64
These examples from consumer-protection law demonstrate how
private enforcement under state law can prove useful in mitigating
concerns over capture and limited federal resources. It can do so while
giving agencies some room to preempt state law that is inconsistent or
is an obstacle to the federal law’s purpose, 65 even if Congress requires
the agency to satisfy various procedural hurdles to permit more
transparency and easier monitoring. State-law private enforcement,
accordingly, is another tool that Congress can permit in varying degrees
to create an optimal enforcement regime.
***
Sant’Ambrogio makes a valuable contribution in demonstrating
that public and private enforcement occur in more ways than often
appreciated. He has very helpfully identified numerous considerations
that affect enforcement regimes and the kinds of enforcement-regime
designs that favor one consideration over others. By doing so, he has
provided a foundation for thinking more deeply about enforcement and
administrative-adjudication design.
60. See Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22–26 (2015).
61. Id. at 26–30.
62. 12 U.S.C. § 25b (2018).
63. Id. § 25b(d).
64. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C § 5551(a)(2) (concerning federal preemption by CFPB); see also Barkow,
supra note 40, at 54 (“If the concern is that a federal agency will be captured by one-sided industry
interests at the expense of the general public, there is value in making federal regulations a floor
and allowing states to enact laws that are even more protective of the public.”).
65. See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(1)(B) (expressly adopting the obstacle-preemption standard of
Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996)).
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Through this brief essay that identifies three enforcement tools,
I have sought to further Sant’Ambrogio’s work and provide additional
nuance into how private and public enforcement can take different
shapes, depending on Congress’s concerns. When Congress trusts the
enforcing agency, Congress can, for example, permit the agency to have
the first opportunity to address the infraction at issue through primary
jurisdiction. On the flip side, when Congress has less trust in an agency
or concerns over the resources that it seeks to invest in the agency’s
enforcement, Congress can permit the states to assist through either
public or private enforcement to add other enforcing actors and
enforcement resources.
My discussion here is but a beginning. I look forward to
Sant’Ambrogio’s and others’ identification of additional tools to craft
effective enforcement regimes. But until then, I am appreciative of
Sant’Ambrogio’s efforts to provide a theoretical framework for thinking
more deeply about the nature of agencies and enforcement.

